

FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
7/24/2025
BY SARAH R. PENDLETON
CLERK

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division II
State of Washington
7/24/2025 11:52 AM

No. _____

Court of Appeals No. 58483-2-II
Pierce Co. No. 21-1-00127-9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff / Respondent/ Respondent,

v.

CHAD L. JAMES HUGHES,
Defendant / Appellant / Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, PIERCE COUNTY, AND
DIVISION TWO OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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A. INTRODUCTION

Our state has long guaranteed a statutory right to allocution. That right is intended to ensure those convicted of a felony the opportunity to plead for mercy and present information in mitigation before a criminal sentence is imposed.

But does the statutory right to allocution guarantee the defendant an opportunity to plead for mercy *before* the sentencing judge announces the intended sentence?

The majority of lower appellate courts have so held. Division Two here rejected all those cases, some by name. Instead, Division Two held, the allocution right is much more limited and only allows the ability to speak at some point at sentencing before the written judgment and sentence is entered, regardless whether the intended sentence has already been orally pronounced.

In *State v. Hatchie*¹, this Court granted review in part to answer this question, but did not. However, in *dicta*, the Court adopted the position of the majority of lower appellate court decisions by recognizing that the right to allocution is seriously degraded if the defendant only has a chance to speak after the sentencing judge has orally announced the intended sentence.

Division Two's decision is in conflict with that majority position and the Court's indication in *Hatchie*, albeit in *dicta*. Division Two also imports reasoning from a different situation and finds a right to allocution far diminished from the majority - and inconsistent with the purposes of the right. The decision below and the minority position reduce the statutory right to allocution to a hollow promise, rendering it meaningless and causing damage to the public perceptions of the fairness of our criminal sentencing system. It deprives defendants of the

¹*State v. Hatchie*, 161 Wn.2d 390, 166 P.3d 698 (2007).

dignity of a meaningful opportunity to allocute in our state.

This Court should grant review under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), and (4), and should resolve this serious conflict about the actual scope of the statutory right to allocution, which applies in every felony sentencing in this state. Last year, that was more than 5,000 proceedings.

Until this Court decides the fundamental question presented here, the right guaranteed in RCW 9.94A.500(1) is interpreted and applied in completely different ways, depending on the happenstance of geography. Without this Court's decision finally resolving the issue, defendants across the state will continue to receive different rights to allocution, with some being effectively denied of a meaningful right altogether.

B. IDENTITY OF PARTY AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner Chad Hughes, Appellant below, asks the Court to take review of a portion of the amended unpublished

decision of Division Two issued on June 24, 2025, upon reconsideration of its April 1, 2025, unpublished decision. See *State v. Hughes*, ___ P.3d ___ (2025 WL 1744377); see also, *State v. Hughes*, __ P.3d __ (2025 WL 999665). A copy of the amended decision is attached as Appendix A.

The reconsideration was unrelated to the issues presented for review.

C. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW AND ISSUES PRESENTED

Review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2) and (4)

1. Review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2), because Division Two's decision is in conflict with *dicta* in *Hatchie, supra*, and in decisions of the majority of the lower appellate courts, including explicitly *State v. Gonzales*, 90 Wn. App. 852, 954 P.2d 360, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1024 (1998), *State v. Aguilar-Rivera*, 83 Wn. App. 199, 290 P.2d 623 (1996), and *State v. Crider*, 78 Wn. App. 849, 899 P.2d 24 (1995).

The conflicts are significant and result in unequal rights to allocution being given to defendants under the same statute, RCW 9.94A.500(1), across the state.

2. Review should also be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(4), because Division Two's minority position uses faulty reasoning and radically reshapes the allocution right in a way inconsistent with the right's purposes. It defines the statutory right as far less diminished than the majority, which no longer gives a meaningful chance to speak. This harms not only the defendant but also public respect for the system and confidence in its fairness, especially because the statutory right applies at every felony sentencing in this state.

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. *Procedural facts*

After Petitioner Chad L. J. Hughes was convicted by a jury of three of four charged counts of first-degree child molestation, he received a standard range sentence of 98 months with a maximum of life. CP 263-85, 374-76, 470-71; 6RP 1-25.²

Mr. Hughes appealed. See CP 495-515. On April 1, 2025, Division Two of the Court of Appeals issued an

²References to the nine volumes of the verbatim report of proceedings is explained in Appellant's Opening Brief ("AOB") at 4, n. 1.

unpublished opinion affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court subsequently withdrew that opinion and issued an amended opinion on June 24, 2025. *See* App. A at 1. The amendments were not relevant to the issue presented for review. This Petition timely follows.

2. *Facts relevant to issues on review*

Mr. Hughes had never been in trouble before and had no criminal history. CP 474. His standard range was an indeterminate sentence of 98-130 months minimum and a maximum of life. *See* CP 474.

Mr. Hughes sought a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) under RCW 9.94A.670(2). 3RP 1-17, 4RP 1-9, 5RP 1-9; 6RP 1-10; CP 449-50. The State, victim, and victim's family opposed. 6RP 8. But Mr. Hughes qualified. 6RP 14-20.

At sentencing, the judge admitted she had no background or experience in criminal law. 6RP 14-20. She

asked questions about how the sentencing alternative worked and there was discussion about lifetime community custody, which would be imposed. 6RP 14-15, 19-20.

The judge heard from the victim, defense counsel and the prosecution. 6RP 11-19.

Without asking Mr. Hughes if he had anything to say before sentence was pronounced as required under RCW 9.94A.500(1), the sentencing judge then ruled:

This case is difficult. Every case is difficult, difficult to determine what's going to happen to somebody's future, where you're going to be for the next several years. Difficult to look at a victim, or a victim's mother - - and the victim's mother is a victim - - and justify what you do.

There are purposes to punishment; retribution, rehabilitation is a big one, and I think that's why we have these SSOSA reviews.

I'm guided by the statute here. I think he qualifies. But really, under number (4) the statute is very specific about what to consider. Whether the offender or community will benefit from use of this alternative. If it's successful, or course, that's an easy answer. Whether it's convenient in light of the extent and circumstances of the offense, whether the

defendant is amenable to treatment. The risk, I believe the risk assessment was moderate.

But considering the victim opinion, whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition under this section, I think, is paramount, because it indicates that the Court gives great weight to this opinion, whether the offender should receive a treatment disposition.

I consider, when considering the SSOSA here, I wonder about Mr. Hughes' amenability to treatment, what weighs for that and what weighs against that.

I think that ultimately I'm not going to grant the SSOSA. When I weigh all of those factors, the kind of aggravators - - and there's going to be no aggravating sentence here - - I'm going to sentence Mr. Hughes - -

6RP 20 (emphasis added).

At that point, counsel interrupted, "Your Honor, I'm so sorry, but Mr. Hughes has a right to speak at sentencing." 6RP 20. The judge responded, "Oh, my God." 6RP 20. When counsel apologized for interrupting, the judge said, "[n]o, you needed to interrupt." 6RP 21.

The judge apologized to Mr. Hughes, saying, "I do want

to hear what you have to say.” 6RP 21. She then let Mr. Hughes speak. 6RP 21-22. He had been found a “moderate risk” and was accepting responsibility. 5RP 22. He also spoke about focusing on what the family and victim were going through, saying he wished he could take it back and wanted the SSOSA to ensure treatment. 5RP 22.

After he spoke, the sentencing judge told Mr. Hughes, “I appreciate your words,” that he had always been respectful in the courtroom, but that she was “still denying the SSOSA.” 6RP 23. She imposed a term of prison of 98 months minimum and lifetime community custody. 6RP 23-26.

E. REASONS WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO END THE CONFLICT AND FINALLY DECIDE WHETHER THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO SPEAK BEFORE THE INTENDED SENTENCE IS ORALLY ANNOUNCED

The right to allocution has been guaranteed by our state by statute since inception. *See In re the Personal Restraint of*

Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323, 333-34, 6 P.3d 573 (2000). Currently it is codified in RCW 9.94A.500(1), which provides, in relevant part, that at a criminal sentencing hearing under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), “[t]he court shall. . . allow arguments from. . . the offender. . . as to the sentence to be imposed.”

This Court has recognized the importance of the statutory right throughout its prior iterations. *See, e.g., Echeverria*, 141 Wn.2d at 333-34; *State v. Canfield*, 154 Wn.2d 798, 701, 116 P.3d 391 (2005). The Court has described allocution as “the right of a criminal defendant to make a personal argument or statement to the court before pronouncement of sentence.” *Echeverria*, 141 Wn.2d at 333-34, 337. It has also declared the right “a significant aspect of the sentencing process.” *Id.*

But this Court has not resolved the question presented here. Does the statutory right to allocution guarantee the

defendant a chance to speak before the sentencing judge orally announces the intended sentence?

Or is the right far more limited, as Division Two here held, only allowing the defendant to speak at some point before the written judgment and sentence is entered?

The majority of court of appeals decisions in this state have found the right allows the chance to speak before an oral announcement of the intended sentence. *See Gonzales*, 90 Wn. App. at 854; *Aguilar-Rivera*, 83 Wn. App. at 200; *Crider*, 78 Wn. App. at 858-61. Here, Division Two explicitly cited these cases, then departed from them. App. A at 4-7. The court of appeals readopted the same “finality” and “writing” requirement it had used in its decision in *Hatchie*, explicitly. App. A at 7-8; *see State v. Hatchie*, 133 Wn. App. 100, 135 P.3d 519 (2006), *affirmed on other grounds*, 161 Wn.2d 390, 166 P.3d 698 (2007).

It thus converted the statutory right to allocution into a

right to ask for reconsideration of a sentencing decision already announced.

The reasoning Division Two used was imported from a different line of cases involving a different situation with a different purpose - whether an oral or written ruling is "final" and, when they conflict, which one controls. App. A at 6-7. But the policies and purposes of that line of cases are completely different and does not involve balancing the rights of a defendant to plead for mercy before sentencing as allocution requires.

This Court should grant review under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), and (4). Division Two's decision is in direct conflict with the majority of court of appeals decisions, and fails to give the defendant a truly meaningful opportunity to address the sentencing court before the sentence is announced. As the *Crider* Court held, "an opportunity to speak extended for the first time after the sentence has been imposed is a totally

empty gesture,” even “when the court stands ready and willing to alter the sentence when presented with new information[.]” 78 Wn. App. at 861. The Court noted, “[f]rom the defendant’s perspective, the opportunity comes too late. The decision has been announced, and the defendant is arguing from a disadvantaged position.” *Id.*

This Court quoted this same language in *Hatchie*, albeit in *dicta*. 161 Wn.2d at 405-406. But unlike in *Hatchie*, here the issue is preserved. See App. A at 4-5.

The statutory right to allocution applies in every felony sentencing in this state. RCW 9.94A.500(1). But different divisions and panels of the courts of appeals have read the same statute and found radically different rights. Under Division Two’s minority position, the right to allocution is diminished to a point that it is no longer meaningful. As the *Aguilar-Rivera* Court noted, this impacts not just the defendant’s right but also “the appearance of fairness,” which

is degraded when the sentencing judge orally announces the intended sentence before inviting the defendant to speak. 83 Wn. App. at 202.

The Court has recognized the importance of the statutory right to allocution and has declared that the failure to honor the right is legal error. *See Hatchie*, 161 Wn.2d at 405-406. It granted review in *Hatchie* in part to resolve the dispute and issue presented in this case. *See id.* The lower appellate court decision of Division Two in *Hatchie* used the same flawed reasoning and reached the same improper result arrived at here. *See App. A at 7; Hatchie*, 133 Wn. App. at 10 (*citations omitted*).

Division Two's ruling denigrates not only the statutory right but the integrity of the criminal sentencing system and the public's perception of its fairness. *See id.* No reasonably objective observer would believe the defendant was actually heard and his allocution considered if the judge has already

orally stated the sentencing decision - here, to deny Mr.

Hughes the SSOSA he qualified for and was seeking.

Division Two's limited version of the statutory right to allocution and the conflict it presents are significant issues of criminal justice which need this Court's authoritative ruling. See RAP 13.4(b)(4). Across the state, the very same statute currently provides different rights to allocution based solely on the happenstance of geography. There is no clarity and consistency in the right's scope.

The question presented has huge impact, too. In 2024, more than 16,000 criminal sentences were imposed in our state, with at least 5,000 of them involving felonies. See 2024 Superior Court Annual Report: Criminal Case Completions and Sentences, *available at* <https://www.courts.wa.gov/caseload/?fa=caseload.showReport&level=s&freq=a&tab=criminal&fileID=crmcm2yr>.

In every one of those cases, RCW 9.94A.500(1) should

mean the same thing. Defendants across the state should all have the same statutory allocution rights.

Because Division Two found no error, it did not address whether - or how - "harmless error" analysis applies. *See* App. A. Lower appellate courts are in disagreement on that issue, but it was not addressed in this case by Division Two. *See, e.g., Aguilar-Rivera*, 83 Wn. App. at 202; *Crider*, 78 Wn. App. at 853; *compare, Gonzales*, 90 Wn. App. at 854-55; *see* App. A at 1-9. Thus, it is not an issue before this Court.

Review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), and (4), to resolve the conflicts, give an authoritative answer to what, exactly, the statutory right to allocution protects, and ensure that all defendants facing felony sentencing in our state have the same meaningful right to address the sentencing court under RCW 9.94A.500(1), before the intended sentence is orally announced.

F. CONCLUSION

The statutory right to allocution applies in every felony sentencing in this state. This Court should grant review under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), and (4), to resolve the conflict and finally decide the scope of the statutory right. Review is needed to ensure that all defendants across the state are given a meaningful chance to speak before the sentence is orally announced, consistent with the purposes of the right and its importance in the actual and perceived integrity and fairness of our felony sentencing scheme.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2025.
SUBMITTED IN 14 POINT TYPE BEFORE PDF
CONVERSION FROM WORDPERFECT, ESTIMATED
WORD COUNT: 2,592

Respectfully submitted,



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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION, SEE WA R GEN GR 14.1

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.

Chad Lee James HUGHES, Appellant.

No.58483-2-II

I

Filed June 24, 2025

Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court, Docket No:21-1-00127-9, Honorable Jennifer Andrews, Judge.

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UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MAXA, J.

***1** Chad L. J. Hughes appeals his sentence for three counts of first degree child molestation.

At sentencing, Hughes requested a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA). The trial court addressed the request, and indicated that it was not inclined to grant the SSOSA. But before the court announced a sentence, defense counsel interjected and pointed out that Hughes had the right to speak. The court apologized and allowed Hughes to make a statement. The court then stated that it still was denying the SSOSA, formally announced the sentence, and signed the judgment and sentence.

Hughes argues that the trial court violated his statutory right to allocute at sentencing. He also challenges certain provisions in his judgment and sentence.

We hold that (1) the trial court did not violate Hughes's statutory right to allocution; (2) the trial court must reconsider the imposition of special community custody condition 12, which requires Hughes to submit to urinalysis and breath analysis upon request of the community corrections officer (CCO) or chemical dependency treatment provider, in light of *State v. Nelson*, ___ Wn.3d ___, 565 P.3d 906 (2025); (3) a provision in the judgment and sentence regarding the return of seized property is not unlawful; and (4) as the State concedes, the provisions in the judgment and sentence allowing for the payment of community supervision costs and the DNA collection fee must be stricken.

Accordingly, we affirm Hughes's sentence for first degree child molestation, but we remand for the trial court to consider the imposition of special community custody condition 12 and to strike the provisions regarding community supervision costs and the DNA collection fee.

FACTS

A jury convicted Hughes of three counts of first degree child molestation. Hughes's standard sentencing range was an indeterminate sentence of 98 to 130 months to life. A certified sex offender treatment provider evaluated Hughes for a SSOSA under RCW 9.94A.670(2).

At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that the trial court should decline Hughes's SSOSA request because it was too lenient and instead should impose a high-end sentence of 130 months to life. Hughes argued that the court should exercise its discretion and grant the SSOSA because he met the eligibility requirements and nonetheless would be subject to lifetime community custody.

After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court began to discuss the reasoning for its sentence. The court noted that it was guided by the SSOSA statute and concluded that Hughes qualified for a SSOSA. The court considered some of the factors under RCW 9.94A.670(4): whether the community would benefit from the alternative sentence, the statement from the victim's mother, and whether Hughes would be amenable to treatment. The court then stated, "I think that ultimately I'm not going to grant the SSOSA. When I weigh all of those factors, the kind of aggravators -- and there's going to be no aggravating sentence here -- I'm going to sentence Mr. Hughes --" Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 23, 2023) at 20.

***2** At that point, defense counsel interrupted the court, stating, "Your Honor, I'm so sorry, but Mr. Hughes has a right to speak at sentencing." RP (June 23, 2023) at 20. The court apologized to Hughes and said, "I do want to hear what you have to say." RP (June 23, 2023) at 21. Hughes then

spoke, expressing that he made bad choices, did not have any excuses, cared about the victim, and was ready to take responsibility.

The trial court stated, “I appreciate your words” and noted that Hughes had been respectful at all times in the courtroom. RP (June 23, 2023) at 23. The court then stated, “I am still denying the SSOSA” and stated that it was imposing a minimum sentence of 98 months. RP (June 23, 2023) at 23. The court then signed the judgment and sentence.

Special community custody condition 12 mandated that Hughes must “[b]e available for and submit to urinalysis and/or breathanalysis upon the request of the CCO and/or chemical dependency treatment provider.” Clerk's Papers at 484. Paragraph 4.4 of the judgment and sentence stated,

Property may have been taken into custody in conjunction with this case. Property may be returned to the rightful owner. Any claim for return of such property must be made within 90 days unless forfeited by agreement in which case no claim may be made. After 90 days, if you do not make a claim, property may be disposed of according to law.

CP 473.

Three community custody conditions required Hughes to pay community supervision fees as required by the Department of Corrections (DOC). And the trial court imposed a \$100 DNA collection fee.

Hughes appeals his sentence.

ANALYSIS

A. RIGHT TO ALLOCUTION

Hughes argues that he was denied his right to allocution when the trial court stated that it thought it was not going to grant a SSOSA before he was allowed to speak. We disagree.

1. Waiver

Initially, the State argues that Hughes failed to properly preserve the alleged violation of his statutory right to allocution by failing to object before the trial court began discussing its sentence. We disagree.

To preserve an allocution error on appeal, “the defendant must give the court some indication of his wish to plead for mercy or offer a statement in mitigation of his sentence.” *State v. Canfield*, 154 Wn.2d 698, 707, 116 P.3d 391 (2005). If a defendant does not request the right of allocution, the failure to allow allocution cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal. *Id.*; see also *State v. Hatchie* 161 Wn.2d 390, 406, 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (holding that the defendant failed to preserve his right to allocution when he failed to object and stayed silent when the prosecutor requested that allocution be provided).

Here, defense counsel interrupted the trial court's discussion of its sentence and noted that Hughes had the right to speak at sentencing. So unlike in *Hatchie*, Hughes did not remain silent. Arguably, defense counsel should have interrupted as soon the trial court started to discuss sentencing. But we conclude that defense counsel's interruption was sufficient to preserve his challenge on appeal.

2. Legal Principles

“Allocution is the right of a criminal defendant to make a personal argument or statement to the court before the pronouncement of sentence.” *Canfield*, 154 Wn.2d at 701. The right to allocute is statutory. RCW 9.94A.500(1) states, “The court shall ... allow arguments from ... the offender... as to the sentence to be imposed.” Failure to provide a defendant with an opportunity for allocution is error. *Hatchie*, 161 Wn.2d at 406.

***3** Several cases have addressed the situation in which the trial court announced its sentence before the defendant was given the opportunity to allocute. In *State v. Delange*, the trial court stated its intention to impose a certain sentence, and then the defendant objected because she had been denied the right to allocute. 31 Wn. App. 800, 801, 644 P.2d 1200 (1982). The court allowed the defendant to speak, and then formally announced the same sentence. *Id.* at 801-02. Division Three of this court held that the right to allocute had not been violated. *Id.* at 803. The court stated,

Here, the record shows the court had not entered its formal sentence prior to allowing defendant to speak in her own behalf, but had only indicated some of the underlying reasons for the sentence that it intended to enter. The defendant was then given an opportunity to speak directly to the court's reasons for accepting the recommendation in the presentence report. Consequently, she was given her right of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence, in compliance with *Happy*.¹ Although that right should have been afforded before

the court revealed its intention with respect to sentence, its failure to do so was inadvertent. When defense counsel brought this to the court's attention, defendant was immediately given the opportunity to speak. Under these circumstances, *Happy* does not mandate reversal and remand for resentencing.

Id. at 802-03.

¹ *State v. Happy*, 94 Wn.2d 791, 620 P.2d 97 (1980). The court in *Happy* held that a defendant must be provided with the right of allocution. *Id.* at 792.

In *State v. Crider*, the trial court rejected a SSOSA request and entered a judgment and sentence. 78 Wn. App. 849, 852, 899 P.2d 24 (1995). At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the defendant immediately filed a notice of appeal based on the court's failure to offer him allocution. *Id.* at 853. The court then asked the defendant if he wanted to speak, but defense counsel pointed out that at that point allocution was an empty gesture. *Id.* The defendant did briefly address the court, but the sentence did not change. *Id.* Division Three reversed. *Id.* at 861.

The court stated,

[W]e agree with [the defendant] that an opportunity to speak extended for the first time after sentence has been imposed is “a totally empty gesture.” Even when the court stands ready and willing to alter the sentence when presented with new information (and we assume this to be the case here), from the defendant's perspective, the opportunity comes too late. The decision has been announced, and the defendant is arguing from a disadvantaged position.

Id. In addition, the court refused to apply harmless error, stating, “Applying harmless error in the face of a total failure of allocution prior to imposition of sentence would severely erode a right which the State concedes to be fundamental.” *Id.*

In *State v. Aguilar-Rivera*, the trial court formally announced its sentence and directed the defendant to come forward for fingerprinting. 83 Wn. App. 199, 200–201, 920 P.2d 623 (1996). The defendant then pointed out that he was not given the right of allocution. *Id.* at 201. The court allowed the defendant to speak, but adhered to the sentence it had announced. *Id.* Division One reversed, stating that the case was more like *Crider* than *Delange*. *Id.* at 203.

The court stated, “Although it is clear to us that the sentencing judge sincerely tried to listen to allocution with an open mind, the judge's oversight effectively left [the defendant] in the difficult position of asking the judge to reconsider an already-imposed sentence.” *Id.* The court continued,

*4 We reject the rule announced in *Delange* that a court's omission of a defendant's allocution right does not mandate reversal as long as sentence has not been formally entered. We hold that the appearance of fairness requires that when the right of allocution is inadvertently omitted until after the court has orally announced the sentence it intends to impose, the remedy is to send the defendant before a different judge for a new sentencing hearing.

Id.

In *State v. Gonzales*, defense counsel argued for the recommended low-end sentence, and the defendant stated that he wanted to get the sentencing over with. 90 Wn. App. 852, 853-54, 954 P.2d 360 (1998). The court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the standard range without giving the defendant his right of allocution. *Id.* at 854. Division One stated, “[C]ontrary to the holdings of *Aguilar-Rivera*, and *Crider*, we hold that the inadvertent failure of the trial court to grant the right is not always reversible error. The facts of this case show why a harmless error analysis should be available, albeit used infrequently.” *Id.* The court acknowledged that the trial court erred, but pointed out that resentencing would be a useless act because the defendant already had received the lowest possible standard range sentence. *Id.* at 855. Therefore, the court affirmed. *Id.*

In *Hatchie*, the trial court stated that it would impose a 55 month sentence unless the defendant had something to say on his behalf. 133 Wn. App. 100, 105, 35 P.3d 519 (2006), *aff'd on other grounds*, 161 Wn.2d 390, 166 P.3d 698 (2007). The prosecutor then interjected and suggested that the court formally ask the defendant if he wanted to allocute. *Id.* at 106. The defendant then addressed the court, and the court imposed a 53 month sentence. *Id.*

This court stated,

We decline to follow *Crider*, *Aguilar-Rivera*, or *Gonzales*. We initially note the long standing rule that a court's oral opinion is no more than an oral expression of the court's informal opinion at the time rendered; it is “necessarily subject to further study and consideration, and may be altered, modified, or completely abandoned.” A court's oral ruling has no binding or final effect until it is reduced to writing.

Id. at 118 (citations omitted). The court concluded, “The trial court's premature statement of its contemplated sentence is therefore not the imposition of a sentence. As such, [the defendant] was provided a meaningful opportunity to address the court before sentence was imposed.” *Id.*

The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that Hatchie did not properly object. *Hatchie*, 161 Wn.2d at 406. But the Supreme Court noted in dicta that when the defendant was allowed to speak he “did so from the disadvantaged position of already hearing the court's tentative sentence.” *Id.* at 405-06.

3. Analysis

Here, the trial court stated it *thought* it was not going to grant a SSOSA before giving Hughes a chance to allocute. But the court had not yet announced its sentence. And after being interrupted, the court expressly stated that it wanted to hear what Hughes had to say. After hearing Hughes's allocution and noting that it appreciated Hughes's words, the court stated that that it was “still” denying the SSOSA. RP (June 23, 2023) at 23. But the court disregarded the State's recommendation and imposed a low-end sentence.

These facts are different than those in *Crider* and *Aguilar-Rivera*. In *Crider*, the trial court already had formally imposed its sentence and entered the judgment and sentence, the sentencing hearing had ended, and the defendant had filed a notice of appeal before allocution was allowed. 78 Wn. App. at 852-53. In *Aguilar-Rivera*, the trial court had formally announced its sentence and had directed the defendant to come forward for fingerprinting before allocution was allowed. 83 Wn. App. at 200-01. We agree that after the sentence has been formally announced, the judgment and sentence has been entered, and the sentencing hearing essentially is over, allocution is meaningless, an “empty gesture.” *Crider*, 78 Wn. App. at 853.

***5** Unlike in *Crider* and *Aguilar-Rivera*, the trial court here had not formally announced its sentence. The court had stated an intention to deny the SSOSA, but it had not unequivocally done so. Instead, the court made a “premature statement of its *contemplated* sentence.” *Hatchie*, 133 Wn. App. at 118 (emphasis added). The court stated, “I *think* that ultimately I'm not going to grant the SSOSA.” RP (June 23, 2023) at 20 (emphasis added). But the court had not formally announced its sentence, the judgment and sentence had not yet been signed, and the sentencing hearing had not ended. Allocution was allowed in time for the court to consider Hughes's comments before announcing its sentence.

We agree with this court's analysis in *Hatchie*. Although the trial court stated its intention to deny the SSOSA, this was “no more than an oral expression of the court's informal opinion at the time rendered.” *Hatchie*, 133 Wn. App. at 118. That opinion was subject to modification before the court formally announced its sentence. *See id.* As a result, Hughes “was provided a meaningful

opportunity to address the court before sentence was imposed.” *Id.*; see also *Delange*, 31 Wn. App. at 801–02 (although the trial court gave some of the underlying reasons for the sentence that it intended to enter before the defendant spoke, the defendant “was given her right of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence.”).

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not violate Hughes's right to allocution at sentencing.

B. URINALYSIS AND BREATH ANALYSIS CONDITION

Hughes challenges special community custody condition 12, under which he was required to “[b]e available for and submit to urinalysis and/or breathanalysis upon the request of the CCO and/or chemical dependency treatment provider.” We remand for the trial court to consider imposition of this condition in light of *Nelson*, 565 P.3d 906.

C. SEIZED PROPERTY PROVISION

Hughes argues that the trial court acted beyond its statutory authority by including paragraph 4.4 in the judgment and sentence. We disagree.

Section 4.4 of the judgment and sentence states that certain property taken in conjunction with a criminal case may be returned to the rightful owner. It then states that a property owner has 90 days to request their property back or it will be disposed of. Hughes refers to this as a forfeiture provision.

But Section 4.4 does not affirmatively require Hughes to give up any property. It informs Hughes that he may request his property back, if taken at all. Paragraph 4.4 does not provide for the forfeiture of Hughes's property. Accordingly, we reject Hughes's argument.

D. COMMUNITY SUPERVISION AND DNA COLLECTION FEES

Hughes argues, and the State concedes, that the provisions regarding community supervision fees and the DNA collection fee must be stricken. We agree.

In 2022, the legislature eliminated trial courts’ ability to impose supervision fees as a condition of community custody in 2022. See LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 7. RCW 9.94A.703, which dictates the conditions of community custody, no longer allows for the imposition of community custody supervision fees on convicted defendants.

Similarly, former RCW 43.43.7541 (2018) required every sentence to include a \$100 DNA collection fee unless the offender's DNA previously had been collected. However, the legislature eliminated this provision effective July 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449 § 4. Although this

amendment took effect after Hughes's sentencing, it applies to cases pending on appeal. *State v. Ellis*, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023).

Accordingly, we hold that the provisions regarding supervision fees and the DNA collection fee must be stricken from the judgment and sentence.

CONCLUSION

***6** We affirm the trial court's sentence, but we remand for the trial court to consider the imposition of special community custody condition 12 and to strike the provisions regarding supervision fees and the DNA collection fee.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

We concur:

VELJACIC, A.C.J.

GLASGOW, J.

All Citations

Not Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2025 WL 1744377

RUSSELL SELK LAW OFFICE

July 24, 2025 - 11:52 AM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division II
Appellate Court Case Number: 58483-2
Appellate Court Case Title: State of Washington, Respondent v. Chad Lee James Hughes, Appellant
Superior Court Case Number: 21-1-00127-9

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